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Singer: To Tell the Truth, Memory Isn't That Good

ARTICLE

TO TELL THE TRUTH, MEMORY ISN'T THAT GOOD
Tom Singer*

"The palest ink is better than the best memory."
- Chinese Proverb

"When you ask how I've been here without you,
I like to say I've been fine, and I do.
But we both know the truth is hard to come by,
And if I told the truth, that's not quite true."
-

Bob Feller

Some Days are Diamonds
(Some Days are Stones)

A PARABLE

The week of trial is almost over. The parties watch
nervously as Judge Judith Justiciable reads instructions to the
thirteen jurors, who look interested, but puzzled. The jurors
range in age from 20 to 73 and have varying levels of education.
* Civil trial attorney at TTS, PLLC, in Billings, Montana. J.D. cum laude, Harvard Law
School 1978. B.A., Eastern Montana College 1975.
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One dropped out of high school as a junior, and seven never
went past high school. Five went to college, but only two
graduated. One (the 20-year old) is still working on a degree.
Other than her, all of the jurors have been out of school for at
least 15 years. For all of them, school was the last time in their
lives that they were asked to sit in uncomfortable chairs for
hours at a time and try to remember what people were telling
them. Most of them were not very good at it when they were in
school, and they are not any better at it now.
As the judge reads instructions, the lawyers are still
rehearsing their closing arguments in their heads. One of the
lawyers doesn't trust his recall about exactly what the key
witnesses said on the stand, and worries that if he misstates the
testimony, the jurors will think he is lying to them. He worried
about that while he ate breakfast this morning. As a result, he
forgot about his lactose intolerance and used milk on his cereal,
so he will feel bloated and probably be flatulent all morning.
The other attorney has been so wrapped up in this case that he
has forgotten to file the complaint in a multi-million dollar
personal injury action and blown the statute of limitations.
Both lawyers also happen to have wedding anniversaries today,
and both will forget to bring home gifts for their spouses. For
one of them, that will be the last straw and the marriage will
end in divorce.
Both lawyers expect the verdict to turn on the testimony of
Shurras Istandhere, the only witness who testified about the
discriminatory remarks allegedly made by the Defendant,
Huegot Dewrongman.
Istandhere, Dewrongman and seven
other witnesses all took the standard courtroom oath to tell the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
Dewrongman denied that he discriminated against the
Plaintiff, and he also denied that he had lied about what he had
said and done. But he had no evidence to corroborate his
position, so his lawyer, Rip Herup, had to impeach Shurras
Istandhere through cross-examination. He questioned her about
her hearing, whether she was wearing her hearing aid and had
it turned up high enough. He pointed out that she claimed she
had heard the remarks while she was walking quickly past
Dewrongman in the hall, that it was noisy and hectic, and that
she had heard only a fragment of the conversation. Rip Herup
also got Shurras to admit she disliked Dewrongman and felt
threatened by him, so passing him in the hall was always scary
and a little traumatic for her. Nonetheless, Shurras was
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/5
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unshakeable in her conviction that she had heard Dewrongman
make inappropriate and discriminatory remarks about the
Plaintiff. She swore, "I'll never forget his words."
The lawyers aren't paying much attention while the judge
drones out the stock instructions that neither of them had read,
much less objected to. To tell the truth, the judge is not paying
much attention either. She is distracted because an old rock and
roll song has been running through her head and she cannot
remember the lyrics. For what seems like the thousandth time,
she reads MPI 1.02, which says in part:
You are the sole judges of the facts in this case. It is up to you to
determine which witnesses you will believe and what weight will
be given to their testimony. In doing so, you may consider, for
example, such things as their demeanor, apparent bias or
prejudice, motive to testify truthfully or falsely, consistency,
ability and opportunity to perceive, recall and communicate, or the
overall reasonableness of their testimony in the light of all the
other evidence.
At the outset, a witness is entitled to a presumption that his or her
testimony is truthful. This presumption may be overcome,
however, by any evidence tending to disprove that testimony or
raising a substantial question as to the witness' credibility. A
witness false in one part of his or her testimony is to be distrusted
in others. However, this rule does not apply to a witness who
unintentionally commits an error.

After the judge finishes the instructions, the lawyers give
closing arguments. Then the jury retires to eat lunch and
deliberate. An hour later, the jury returns a verdict against
Dewrongman. Over the next few days, Rip Herup calls some of
the jurors to ask why they ignored his cross-examination. All of
them say they believed Shurras Istandhere and Dewrongman
offered no evidence to contradict her. One of the jurors mentions
something more specific: the judge's instruction that said
Shurras Istandhere was presumed to speak the truth. The juror
says that instruction iced the case.
Rip hangs up, and curses the jury system. He tells his
secretary he would never trust his fate to a jury, and he feels
lucky that he is an insurance defense lawyer handling a
discrimination claim rather than a public defender in a murder
trial. At least his client won't go to jail, or worse.
Then he walks into his office and rereads the instruction. It
does say a witness's testimony is presumed to be truthful. It
also says the presumption can be overcome, but only by
evidence. He wonders what evidence he could have offered. He
wonders why he had never noticed the language before, because
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2002
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it really does not make sense. Like the song says, "truth is hard
to come by." In every trial, some of the witnesses forget, make
mistakes about, reinterpret, shade, and prevaricate the truth. If
they didn't, there would be no trials. Presuming that every
witness speaks the truth makes as much sense as assuming that
every player in a poker game holds four aces. It just does not
add up.
What's more, the instruction seems to contradict the
instructions courts give on the burden of proof. Especially when
the burden of proof is only a preponderance of evidence, the
presumption that any testimonial evidence is true makes it
pretty easy to tip the scales toward a favorable verdict.
Rip does a little research. He learns the presumption of
truth has been disapproved in federal criminal cases for more
than 25 years, and it is no longer part of the standard
instructions in federal civil cases or in Montana criminal cases.
He learns that some courts have adopted instructions in
criminal cases "to caution jurors about the inaccuracies in
eyewitness identifications,"' and that "some of the traditional
barriers to eyewitness identification expert testimony are
coming down." 2 He also discovers that the problems with
eyewitness testimony have been recognized for decades, and
that "psychologists have developed an impressive body of
research [about those problems] that cannot be ignored."3 Yet,
in Montana at least, the problems have been ignored, and the
presumption of truth remains a part of the standard instructions
in all civil cases.
I. INTRODUCTION

Our lawmakers and courts have long held schizoid views
about the worth of testimonial evidence.
On one hand,
skepticism about the accuracy of human memory is reflected in
the doctrine of laches, the parol evidence rule, the corroboration
requirements for crimes such as accountability and defamation, 4

1.

Laurie Levenson, Criminal Law: Eyewitness IDs, NAT'L L.J., July 10, 2000, at

A20.
2. Warren Wolfson, "That's the Man!" Well, Maybe Not: The Case for Eyewitness
Identification Expert Testimony, 26 LITIG., Winter, 2000, at 5.
3. Id.
4. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-213 (2001) provides: "A person may not be found
guilty of an offense on the testimony of one responsible or legally accountable for the
same offense, as defined in 45-2-301, unless the testimony is corroborated by other
evidence that in itself and without the aid of the testimony of the one responsible or
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statutes of limitations that are shorter for oral contract claims
than for written contract claims, 5 and other firmly-entrenched
legal doctrines. On the other hand, over the past half-century
courts and legislatures have lengthened statutes of limitations
for child sexual assault claims, 6 recognized a plethora of causes
of action, as well as some defenses, that depend principally on
testimony, 7 and adopted rules of evidence that allow testimony
from any competent witness who has personal knowledge that is
relevant.8 During the 20th century, courts and legislators have
tended to be more willing than their predecessors to admit
testimonial evidence, to rest judgments on uncorroborated
testimony, and to recognize causes of action and defenses based
on uncorroborated testimony. 9
If the pendulum swung toward acceptance of testimonial
evidence during most of the last century, it may be swinging the
other way now. In the summer of 2000, Texas officials executed
Gary Graham for a murder that occurred outside a Houston
supermarket. Prosecutors had no physical evidence linking
Graham to the crime. He was convicted based on the testimony
of a lone eyewitness, whose testimony was contradicted by other
legally accountable for the same offense tends to connect the defendant with the
commission of the offense."
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-212(4) (2001) provides: "A person may not be
convicted on the basis of an oral communication of defamatory matter except upon the
testimony of at least two other persons that they heard and understood the oral
statement as defamatory or upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere."
5. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-202 (2001) provides an eight-year limitation period
for written contracts and a five year period for oral contracts.
6. Gary Ernsdorff & Elizabeth Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Word of
Caution about Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression, 84 J.
CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 129, 145-53 (1993).
7. See discussion infra Parts II and V.
8. See MONT. R. EVID. 601, 602; FED. R. EvID. 601, 602. The rules of evidence
require less of a foundation for testimonial evidence than for any other kind of evidence.
Documents must be authenticated, photographs must be shown to accurately reflect the
scene depicted, and fingerprints and DNA samples must be proven to have been properly
obtained, processed, and linked to the case, but a witness can testify to relevant facts
without being first asked to establish that she is capable of and did accurately perceive
and recall the relevant events. The rules seem to presume that all witnesses have the
necessary capabilities, and leaves it to opposing counsel to question whether the witness
actually exercised the capabilities at the critical time.
9. These developments in the law of evidence and other fields have occurred as
"ls]cholars who study the social psychology of evidence have investigated how rules of
evidence affect jury decision-making, how juries react to evidence, whether psychological
assumptions underlying rules of evidence are valid, and what factors influence the
reliability of evidence given by witnesses." Roger Park, Evidence Scholarship: Old and
New, 75 MINN.L.REV. 849, 851 (1991). For whatever reasons, the work of these scholars
has "had little or no influence on evidence scholarship." Id. at 849.
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witnesses at the scene but was nevertheless sufficient to
convince a jury to convict Graham.
Graham's execution
prompted commentators to renew the call for criminal courts to
issue special jury instructions and allow expert testimony by
cognitive psychologists about the unreliability of eyewitness
testimony. 10 To support their argument, the commentators cited
research by the cognitive psychologists, as well as research
reports that had identified dozens of convictions based on
eyewitness identifications that had to be vacated because DNA
testing proved the defendants were innocent. 1 Some courts
have heeded the call by allowing expert testimony or giving
12
precautionary instructions.
That the courts and commentators would focus on serious
criminal cases, where life and liberty are at stake, is
understandable. However, concerns about the unreliability of
eyewitness testimony also are present in civil cases where a
claim or a defense relies on
uncorroborated testimony. Testimonial evidence is often
the sole basis for claims such as fraud, discrimination and
infliction of emotional distress, as well as defenses such as
mistake, waiver, promissory estoppel and assumption of risk.
While the stakes in these civil claims and defenses are less
severe than the stakes in a serious felony prosecution, the risk
that unreliable testimony will taint verdicts actually may be
higher in civil cases because the burden of proof is lower.
In Montana, concerns about the unreliability of testimonial
evidence in civil cases are exacerbated because a standard jury
instruction used since the mid-19th century says, "a witness is
entitled to a presumption that his or her testimony is truthful."
In this article, I argue the pendulum should swing sharply
away from reliance on uncorroborated testimony in civil cases.
Specifically, the presumption of truth instruction should be
abandoned in all cases and be replaced with an instruction
cautioning juries about the unreliability of testimonial evidence,
including eyewitness testimony. The presumption of truth
instruction is an historical anomaly that improperly favors
claims and defenses based on testimonial evidence as opposed to
those that rest on documentary and scientific evidence, which
generally are more reliable and more probative. Rather than

10.
11.
12.

See, e.g., LEVENSON, supra note 1; WOLFSON, supra note 2, at 5.
WOLFSON, supra note 2.
Id.
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telling juries to presume the testimony of witnesses is true,
courts should be cautioning juries about the fallibility of human
perception and memory, or welcoming expert testimony
explaining the growing body of research in cognitive psychology
and related fields about the vagaries of the human mind's skill
in observing, storing, and recreating events.
I look, first, at the history of the presumption in Montana
and elsewhere.
Second, I summarize the history of the
presumption in federal courts, all of which have disapproved it.
Third, I offer an overview of the body of psychological research
concerning human perception and memory. Finally, I argue the
presumption should be replaced by an instruction cautioning
jurors about relying on uncorroborated testimonial evidence, and
I propose such an instruction. My hope is that the Montana
Supreme Court will finally
disapprove a quaint and silly
anachronism that could be leading jurors astray.
II. WHENCE THIS PRESUMPTION?
In Montana, (and in some other states, 13) the presumption
that witnesses testify truthfully is statutory. Section 26-1-302
provides:
26-1-302. Witness presumed to speak the truth - how
presumption rebutted. A witness is presumed to speak the
truth. The jury or the court in the absence of a jury is the exclusive
judge of his credibility. This presumption may be controverted and
overcome by any matter that has a tendency to disprove the
truthfulness of a witness' testimony; such matters include but are
not limited to:
(1) the demeanor or manner of the witness while testifying;
(2) the character of the witness' testimony;
(3) bias of the witness for or against any party involved in the
case;
(4) interest of the witness in the outcome of the litigation or other
motive to testify falsely;
(5) the witness' character for truth, honesty, or integrity;
(6) the extent of the witness' capacity and opportunity to perceive
or capacity to recollect or to communicate any matter about which
he testifies;

13. The Montana statute was based on a California statute that has been repealed.
A similar statute is still on the books in Oregon. See, OR. REV. STAT. § 44.370 (2001)
("Witness presumed to speak truth; jury judges of credibility"). The Oregon statute was
challenged unsuccessfully on constitutional grounds in Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141
(1973).
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(7) inconsistent statements of the witness;
(8) an admission of untruthfulness by the witness;
(9) other evidence contradicting the witness' testimony.

A shorter version of the statute was first enacted in 1877. It
was taken from the California Code of Civil Procedure. It was
re-enacted as part of Montana's Civil Code in 1895. The statute
has been amended only once, in 1983. Before it was amended, it
read:
A witness is presumed to speak the truth. This presumption,
however, may be repelled by the manner in which he testifies, by
the character of his testimony, by evidence affecting his motives or
his character for truth, honesty, or integrity, or by contradictory
14
evidence; and the jury is the exclusive judge of his credibility.

No similar statutory presumption was ever part of
Montana's criminal code, but Section 2078 of the 1895 Penal
Code, which was derived from California's Penal Code, provided
that: "The rules of evidence in civil actions are applicable also to
15
criminal actions, except as otherwise provided in this Code."
Today, the statute reads: "The Montana Rules of Evidence and
the statutory rules of evidence in civil actions are applicable also
to criminal actions, except as otherwise provided."'16 Under that
statute, the presumption that witnesses speak the truth would
apply equally in civil and criminal actions.
For many years - probably from the time the presumption
was codified in 1877 until the early 1960s, when the Montana
Jury Instruction Guide Criminal was promulgated - trial courts
instructed juries about the presumption by reading the statute
17
or something very similar to it in both criminal and civil cases.
As late as 1959, trial courts were admonished by the Montana
Supreme Court not to append "unauthorized exceptions" onto
8
the statutory presumption of truth instruction.'
14. MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-302 (1981). The use of the term "repelled" is a
curiosity. Oregon's statutory presumption, which was adopted in 1862, uses "overcome."
See OR. REV. STAT. § 44.370 (2001).
15. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2078 (1895). [NOT RIGHT]
16. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-201 (2001).
17. Use of the statutory presumption instruction was endorsed in cases such as
State v. Kessler, 74 Mont. 166, 169, 239 P. 1000, 1001 (1925) (holding that "ordinarily an
instruction based upon [the pre-1983 version of 26-1-302] is sufficient"). Two of the
latest cases to invoke the statutory presumption language are Jeffries Coal Co. v. Indus.
Accident Bd., 131 Mont. 511, 518, 312 P.2d 128, 133 (1957) (deciding an action to recover
unpaid worker's compensation premiums), and State v. Wild, 130 Mont. 476, 490, 305
P.2d 325, 333 (1956) (deciding a criminal case for selling alcohol to minors).
18. In State v. Cams, 136 Mont. 126, 140, 345 P.2d 735, 743 (1959), the Supreme
Court admonished the trial court not to "write in an unauthorized exception" to the stock

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/5

8

2002

PRESUMPTION
OFTruth,
TRUTHFUL
TESTIMONY
Singer: To Tell the
Memory Isn't
That Good

345

Around 1960, the Montana Judges Association promulgated
the Montana Jury Instruction Guides ("MJIG"). 19 For civil
actions, MJIG 2.02 used the same statutory presumption of
truth instruction that had been given for years. The comment to
MJIG 2.02 said the language "seems clear and sufficient."
Curiously, the language was not sufficient for criminal cases.
The criminal instruction, MJIG 1.02Crim qualified the statutory
presumption of truth language at some length:
You are the sole judges of the credibility of all the witnesses who
have testified in this case, and of the weight to be given their
testimony. A witness is presumed to speak the truth; but this
presumption may be repelled by the manner in which he testifies,
by the nature of his testimony, or by evidence affecting his
character for truth, honesty or integrity, or his motives, or by
contradictory evidence; and in determining the weight to be given
to the testimony of any witness, you have a right to consider the
appearance of each witness on the stand, his manner of testifying,
his apparent candor [sic] or lack of candor, his apparent fairness
or lack of fairness, his apparent intelligence or lack of intelligence,
his knowledge and means of knowledge on the subject upon which
he testifies, together with all the other circumstances appearing in
evidence on the trial.

The instruction went on to state and explain the
presumption of innocence, but did not offer guidance on how the
jury should reconcile any conflicts between those two
presumptions. The committee's reasons for writing different
presumption of truth instructions for civil and criminal cases
apparently were not recorded or preserved, at least in any
20
readily-available source.
For 25 years or more, MJIG was relied on by Montana

statutory instruction on witness credibility. The unauthorized instruction, with the
"unauthorized exception" italicized, read as follows:
A witness is presumed to speak the truth. This presumption, however, may be
repelled by the manner in which he or she testifies, by the character of his or
her testimony, or his or her motives, or by contradictory evidence, and the jury
are the exclusive judges of his credibility.
If you believe from all of the evidence in the case, that any witness who has
testified in this case, has wilfully and deliberately testified falsely to any fact
or matter material to this issue involved herein, then you will be at liberty to
disregard the entire testimony of any such witness, except insofar as it may be
corroboratedby other and credible evidence in the case.
19. MJIG was drafted by a committee, with assistance from Professor Gardner
Cromwell of the University of Montana School of Law.
20. Neither the University of Montana Law Library nor the State Law Library has
any records related to the work of the various committees and commissions that drafted
MJIG and MPI. My attempt to obtain records from the current chair of the Civil Jury
Instructions Guidelines Commission was unsuccessful.
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jurists and practitioners. During that time, the only cases to
address the presumption of truth instruction were criminal
cases. In most of the cases it decided, the Supreme Court held
that MJIG Instruction 1.02Crim was sufficient. In State v.
White, for example, the court affirmed a conviction for burglary
of a gas station based on the testimony of the owner of the
station and a police officer, both of whom saw the defendant and
an accomplice run out of the station into an alley and get into
the car in which they were arrested a short time later.2 1 In
State v. Just, the defendant in a sexual assault case had offered
a cautionary instruction saying, "charges such as the one made
against the defendant in this case are easy to make and hard to
defend against even by one who is guiltless." 22 The trial court
refused the instruction and the Supreme Court affirmed, saying
MJIG 1.02Crim adequately addressed witness credibility,
particularly where there was no evidence that the victim had a
motive to make false accusations, and her testimony was
corroborated by other evidence.
In State v. Stokes, a defendant convicted of burglary and
robbery based on an eyewitness identification argued the trial
court was required to instruct that a witness's believability
could be disproved by evidence of the "extent of his opportunity
and ability to see any matter about which he testifies."23 The
24
Supreme Court disagreed, finding MJIG 1.02Crim satisfactory.
In State v. Sanderson, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed a
sexual intercourse without consent conviction and rejected the
defendant's challenge to MJIG 1.02Crim. 25 The defendant
argued the trial court erred by refusing his instruction that the
presumption could be overcome by prior inconsistent
statements. 26
The Supreme Court held that 1.02Crim's
language "by contradictory evidence" was sufficient to address
7
prior inconsistent statements.2
While the court affirmed many convictions based on MJIG
1.02Crim, it did issue some warnings that the instruction would
not be sufficient in all circumstances. For example, in State v.
Dolan, the Supreme Court agreed "with defendant that
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

151 Mont. 151, 153, 440 P.2d 269, 271 (1968).
184 Mont. 262, 274-75, 602 P.2d 957, 964 (1979).
195 Mont. 321, 327, 637 P.2d 498, 501 (1981).
Id.
214 Mont. 437, 450, 692 P.2d 479, 487 (1985).
Id. at 449-51, 692 P.2d at 486-87.
Id. at 450, 692 P.2d at 486.
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cautionary instructions regarding accomplice testimony and oral
admissions should have been included in the court's jury
instructions," 28 but nevertheless affirmed the conviction for
theft, holding the trial court's error was "minimized" by other
instructions that were directed toward the prosecution's
witnesses, since the defendant had called none. 29 The only
"other instruction" the court pointed to was MJIG 1.02Crim.
In State v. Hart, another case in which the State relied on
eyewitness identification testimony, the defendant had proposed
a lengthy instruction that addressed factors such as the time,
distance, and lighting conditions when the witness observed the
crime, and whether the witness's recollection may have been
influenced by lapse of time or by the circumstances under which
the later identification was made. 30 The trial court refused the
instruction, and the Supreme Court found no error, holding that
However, referring to the
MJIG 1.02C was adequate. 3 1
defendant's proposed instruction, the court also stated, "[s]uch
an instruction may be proper, if not mandatory, in certain cases.
The necessity of this type of instruction is especially clear when
there is only a single eyewitness's unsubstantiated testimony

28. 190 Mont. 195, 202, 620 P.2d 355, 359 (1980).
29. Id. at 203, 620 P.2d at 359.
30.
191 Mont. 375, 392-93, 625 P.2d 21, 31 (1981). The proposed instruction read:
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or impression by the witness.
Its value depends on the opportunity the witness had to observe the offender at
the time of the offense and to make reliable identification later.
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you should
consider the following:
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had a capacity and adequate
opportunity to observe the offender?
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe the offender
at the time of the offense will be affected by such matters as how long or short
a time was available, how far or close the witness was, how good were lighting
conditions, whether the witness had occasion to see or know the person in the
past.
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification made by the witness
subsequent to the offense was a product of his own recollection? You may take
into account both the strength of the identification, and the circumstances
under which the identification was made.
If the identification by the witness may have been influenced by circumstances
under which the defendant was presented to him for identification you should
scrutinize the identification with great care. You may also consider the length
of time that elapsed between the occurrence of the crime and the next
opportunity of the witness to see the defendant, as a factor bearing on the
reliability of the identification. Id.
31. Id. at 393-94, 625 P.2d at 31.
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which identifies the offender." 32
During the quarter century that MJIG was in force, the
Supreme Court rejected the presumption of truth only twice. In
State v. Taylor, decided in 1973, the Supreme Court reversed a
murder conviction on other grounds, but because the case was
remanded for a new trial, and because "the State's principal
witness had admittedly made a number of prior inconsistent
statements," 33 the Supreme Court ordered the trial court on
remand to supplement MJIG 1.02Crim with the following: "A
witness may also be impeached by evidence that he has made, at
other times, statements inconsistent with his present testimony
***

"34

State v. Perry involved a 1988 appeal from a bench trial
where the Supreme Court refused to apply the presumption of
truth to recanted testimony. 35 A convicted murderer argued
that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to
set aside a conviction seventeen years after the fact when an
accomplice recanted the testimony on which the conviction
rested.36 The defendant argued the presumption of truth should
apply equally to the original and recanted testimony, but the
Supreme Court declined to agree. Instead, the court adopted
"the prevailing judicial attitude that recanted testimony is to be
viewed with great suspicion." 37 In doing so, the court apparently
abandoned the presumption of truth as a matter of law under
circumstances that are not recognized by §26-1-302, either in its
original form or as amended in 1983.
In 1990, the MJIG criminal instructions were replaced by
the Montana Pattern Instructions - Criminal ("MPI-Crim"), and
the presumption of truth was suddenly abandoned in criminal
cases. The change is difficult to explain if one looks only at
Montana law. The Montana Supreme Court had found the
presumption of truth instruction incomplete at times, but it had
never suggested that MJIG 1.02Crim was an improper
instruction, or that the presumption of truth should not be
recognized in criminal cases.
Furthermore, the presumption of truth instruction was
preserved in civil cases. Montana Pattern Instructions - Civil
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. (citing United States v. Masterson, 529 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1976)).
163 Mont. 106, 122, 515 P.2d 695, 704 (1973).
Id. (quoting MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 93-1901-12 (1947)).
232 Mont. 455, 465-66, 758 P.2d 268, 275 (1988).
Id.
Id. at 466, 758 P.2d at 275.
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("MPI") 1.02 kept the presumption of truth, albeit in slightly
different form. The new civil instruction incorporated the 1983
changes to §26-1-302. As a result, it reads more like the MJIG
criminal instruction than the MJIG civil instruction.
In the decade since MPI and MPI-Crim were promulgated,
no Montana cases have specifically addressed a presumption of
truth instruction.
Although an instruction has not been
addressed, the presumption has been addressed in civil cases.
In Benjamin v. Torgerson,38 for example, the court recited the
presumption as it affirmed a defense verdict in a civil damages
action for psychological damages resulting from alleged
childhood sexual abuse. 39 The court's holdings did not rest on
the presumption. Rather, the Supreme Court seemed to take
the presumption of truth for granted, just as it and the members
of the Montana bar have for more than 125 years.
In 125 years, no Montana lawyer has gone to the Montana
Supreme Court to challenge the presumption on the grounds
that it is unnecessary, confusing, improper, or unconstitutional.
Lawyers for some criminal defendants have tried to supplement
the instruction, but no one has tried to strike it as inconsistent
with the presumption of innocence or a violation of due process.
In 125 years, the presumption of truth instruction has been read
to tens, if not hundreds of thousands of Montana civil trial
juries, but no appeal has been taken on the grounds that the
instruction was an incorrect statement of the law, improperly
shifted the burden of proof, or was an improper comment on the
evidence.
The lack of attention paid to the instruction in Montana
would make sense if it was widely accepted in other American
jurisdictions.
However, as the Ninth Circuit stated, the
presumption of truth instruction "has been disapproved by every
court of appeals and, so far as we know, by every commentator
who has addressed the subject."40
III. WHY DID FEDERAL COURTS QUIT PRESUMING THAT
TESTIMONY IS TRUTHFUL?
Though juries in Montana and a few other states have been
instructed on the presumption of truth for 125 years or more,
most states never joined that bandwagon. In fact, the 1960
38. 1999 MT 216, 295 Mont. 528, 985 P.2d 734.
39. Id. T 32.
40. United States v. Gutierrez-Espinosa, 516 F.2d 249, 250 (9th Cir. 1975).
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replacement edition of Branson's treatise on jury instructions in
state courts, which was first published in 1914 and still being
updated as late as 1981, said flatly it was error to instruct a jury
that "the law presumes an unimpeached witness has spoken the
truth."41 The authors of that treatise were from the Midwest
and East.42 They cited Montana and Oregon cases for other
propositions, 43 but gave no sign they were even aware of the
statutes and cases in western states that established a
presumption of truth.
About the same time the last edition of Branson's treatise
was published and the Montana Judges Association was
drafting MJIG, a United States District Judge from the
Southern District of California named William C. Mathes
published a compilation of jury instruction forms he had
developed over a ten year period as "a sort of hobby ... to
facilitate oft-repeated acts in the day-to-day work of a United
States District Judge."44 A few years later, Judge Mathes' work
was incorporated in a treatise he co-authored with Judge
Edward Devitt. The treatise was called Federal Jury Practice
and Instructions.45 In 1970, Devitt co-authored a new edition
with Charles Blackmar. The treatise, now written by a new
generation of authors, has grown to nine volumes, is in its fifth
edition, and is widely cited. 46 It is hard to imagine now that
such a comprehensive treatise started as an article of less than
one hundred pages printed in the Federal Rules Decisions.
Judge Mathes' article included a presumption of truth
1 A. H. REID, BRANSON'S THE LAW OF INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES IN CIL AND
41.
CRIMINAL CASES § 37, at 123 (3d ed. 1960) (citing the Illinois case of Chicago Union Trac.

Co. v. O'Brien, 76 N.E. 341 (1905)). Reid was a circuit judge in Wisconsin. The 1960
replacement was prepared by William Samore, a professor at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School in Ohio. The 1981 supplement was written by James Weeks, a professor at
Syracuse University College of Law. The first edition of the treatise was published in
1914 by Edward R. Branson.
42. Id. at i, supp. i.
43. See, e.g., id. at 124, n. 7 & 9.
44. Judge Mathes first published the forms in 1957. Judge William Mathes, Some
Suggested Forms for Use in Criminal Cases, 20 F.R.D. 231 (1957). Three years later, he
published a revised version. Mathes, Jury Instructions and Forms for Federal Criminal
Cases, 27 F.R.D. 39 (1960). In the Foreword to the 1960 edition, Judge Mathes issued "a
reminder that legal forms seem to deteriorate in quality with repeated use, unless the
user makes a conscious effort to improve them." Wise words.
45.

WILLIAM

MATHES

&

EDWARD

DEVITT, FEDERAL

JURY

PRACTICE

AND

INSTRUCTIONS (1965 & Supp. 1968). The presumption of truth instruction appears in §
9.01 Credibility of Witnesses - Discrepancies in Testimony.
46.

KEVIN O'MALLEY, ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS (2000 &

Supp. 2001).
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instruction that "apparently became increasingly used in federal
The instruction articulated the
criminal prosecutions." 47
presumption of truth in terms very similar to MJIG 1.02C.48
The similarity cannot be coincidental. 49 Mathes was from
California, and a number of his instructions incorporated
language from California statutes 50 - the same statutes the
Montana Legislature copied when it adopted the Civil Code in
1895 and the presumption of truth in 1877. 51 That a federal
judge sitting in California would be familiar with California law
and draft instructions incorporating that law is not surprising.
It is surprising, though, that Judge Mathes did not cite
California law as authority for the instruction. Instead, he
quoted the United States Supreme Court's 1943 decision of Tot
v. United States.52 His reliance on Tot is curious because the
decision does not address any of the presumptions listed in the
instruction and actually struck down as unconstitutional a
presumption in a federal criminal statute. The statute forbade
convicted felons from possessing firearms transported in
interstate commerce and presumed that any firearm possessed
Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 144 (1973).
20 F.R.D. at 241-243, forms 7 & 9; 27 F.R.D. at 67-68, form 3.01.
Justice Rehnquist thought the Oregon presumption-of-truthfulness instruction
to have had quite an independent origin" from Judge Mathes's instruction.
Cupp, 414 U.S. at 144. Justice Rehnquist's assumption, which seems to have been made
without exercising his customary skill as a historian, overlooks the probability that the
Oregon statute and Judge Mathes's instruction both flowed from the same source - the
California Civil Code.
50. For example, sections 1847 and 1963 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
apparently were the source for this part of Mathes's general instruction on
presumptions:
Unless and until outweighed by evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that a person
is innocent of crime or wrong; that a witness speaks the truth; that official duty has been
regularly performed; that private transactions have been fair and regular; that the
ordinary course of business has been followed; that things have happened according to
the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life; and that the law has been
obeyed. 20 F.R.D. at 241.
51. The statutes that became and were sections 1847 and 1963 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure were the source of the presumptions codified in sections 26-1-302
and 26-1-602 of the Montana Code Annotated.
52. 319 U.S. 463, 466-70 (1943). Mathes also cited two cases decided in 1891,
neither of which invoked or endorsed the presumption of truth. Aetna Life Insurance
Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891); Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417, 420-21
(1891). In fact, one of the cases refused to credit uncontradicted testimony. In Quock
Ting, the court recited a "general rule" that "positive testimony as to a particular fact,
uncontradicted by any one, should control the decision of the court," but the court
ignored the general rule and instead applied one "of many exceptions" to the rule and
refused to credit the uncontradicted testimony of the father of a sixteen year old boy who
claimed to be an American citizen.
47.
48.
49.
"appears
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The Supreme

Under our decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sustained
if there be no rational connection between the fact proved and the
ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of
the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection between the
two in common experience... [Wihere the inference is so strained
as not to have a reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as
we know them it is not competent for the53legislature to create it as
a rule governing the procedure of courts.

Though Judge Mathes cited this common sense standard
for evaluating presumptions, he seems not to have considered
how it applied to the presumptions incorporated in his own
instructions, or even whether it was appropriate to use the root
"A presumption is an
term "presume" in this context.
assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from
another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in
Under that definition, the
the action or proceeding." 54
presumption of truth is not a true presumption, just as the
presumption of innocence is not a "true presumption at all in the
55
sense of an inference based on probability."
When courts use the term presumption of innocence, they
mean by it "nothing more than another way of emphasizing the
State's burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt." 56 Similarly, the presumption of truth is
merely a way "to get the jury off dead center and to give it some
guidance by which to evaluate the frequently confusing and
57
conflicting testimony which it has heard."
The presumption of truth directs the jury to draw an
inference of truth from the mere fact that a witness - any
witness - has taken the stand and testified under oath. In the
19th century, when the presumption was adopted in California,

53.

Tott, 319 U.S. at 466, 468; 20 F.R.D. at 242-43 form 7; 27 F.R.D. at 51, form

2.04
54. MoNT. R. EVID. 301(a). The comments prepared by the Montana Supreme
Court Commission on Evidence note that Montana's Rule 301 is "entirely different" from
both the federal rule and the uniform rule. Montana's Rule 301 was taken from section
Before Montana adopted Rule 301,
600(a) of the California Evidence Code.
presumptions were defined in section 93-130103 of the Revised Code of Montana (1947),
which was identical to the California statute that preceded § 600(a).
55. State v. Kessler, 458 P.2d 432, 435 (Or. 1969).
56.
57.

Id.
Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 149 (1973). The Oregon Supreme Court has

suggested that both presumptions "might well be dispensed with entirely." Kessler, 458
P.2d at 435.
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Montana and elsewhere, courts and legislators may have
thought it was reasonable to infer that witnesses told the truth
on the stand, in part because the common law had created rules
of competency that prevented some of the most questionable
witnesses from even getting on the stand. For example, under
one common law rule which was codified in Montana, any
person who had a financial stake in a case, including a party,
58
was disqualified from testifying.
Of course, rules such as that one have long since faded from
memory, along with the other 19th century justification for the
presumption, which was the "widely held belief that a willful
violation of the oath would expose the witness 'at once to
temporal and to eternal punishment.' 5 9 The jurists and salons
of that time may be forgiven for thinking that no Ananias would
prevaricate if the consequence would be an instantaneous blow
from a heavenly hand. Unfortunately, faith sometimes has to
give way to experience. Decades without a single reported
smiting on the witness stand have forced courts to abandon the
assumption that perjurers are punished immediately, if at all.
Thus, as Justice Brennan remarked, "the rationale underlying
60
the presumption has been substantially undercut."
Within a decade after Mathes' presumption of truth
instruction was published, most of the federal courts of appeals
had disapproved it, and Mathes' one-time collaborator, Judge
Edward Devitt, had omitted the presumption of truth
instruction from Federal Jury Practice and Instructions. 61
Federal appellate courts condemned the instruction, particularly
in criminal cases where the defendant had called no witnesses,
because it "may 'dilute,' 'conflict with,' 'seem to collide with,' or
'impinge upon' a criminal defendant's presumption of innocence;
'clash with' or 'shift' the prosecution's burden of proof; or
'interfere' with or 'invade' the province of the jury to determine

credibility. "62
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court was asked to
hold the presumption of truth instruction given in an Oregon
58.
1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 488 (1904); WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH & JOHN BURKE, HISTORY OF

ENGLISH LAW 177-197 (7th ed. 1964).
59. Cupp, 414 U.S. at 153-54 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting T. STARKIE,
th
LAW OF EVIDENCE 29 (10 Am. ed. 1876)).

60.

Cupp, 414 U.S. at 153-54 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

61.

EDWARD J. DEVITT & CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND

INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 12.01 & accompanying note (2d ed. 1970).

62.

Cupp, 414 U.S. at 145 (citations omitted).
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armed robbery trial had unconstitutionally infringed the due
process rights of the defendant, who had called none of his own
witnesses. 63 The court recognized the instruction had "been
almost universally condemned," 64 and did not quibble with the
courts that had found the instruction "confusing, of little positive
value to the jury, or simply undesirable, ' 65 but nevertheless held
the problems with the instruction were "not of constitutional
dimension" 66 and allowed the conviction to stand.
Since then, federal appellate courts have continued to
disapprove the instruction and reverse convictions where an
objection was preserved and the instruction was prejudicial;
however, even in cases where convictions were affirmed, the
courts described the instruction as "confusing and useless" or
worse. 6 7 The instruction may not be unconstitutional according
to the United States Supreme Court, but it is improper in almost
every court. The instruction does not appear in any book of
pattern jury instructions, either for criminal or civil cases, or in
Montana's criminal pattern instructions.
Still, it lives on in Montana's civil jury instructions. It does
not belong there unless it meets the standard for presumptions
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Tot, that
there is some reasonable basis for believing that all witnesses or at least the vast majority of witnesses - who testify on the
stand speak the truth.
IV. DOES THE PRESUMPTION ACCURATELY REFLECT HUMAN
BEHAVIOR?
Poet and Lincoln biographer Carl Sandburg in "The People,
Yes," mocked the oath that courts give to witnesses and
challenged the legalistic meaning of truth:
"Do you solemnly swear before the everliving God that the
testimony you are about to give in this cause shall be the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?
"No, I don't. I can tell you what I saw and what I heard and I'll

63. Id. at 144.
64. Id. (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 146.
66. Id. at 149.
67. United States v. Arias-Villanueva, 998 F.2d 1491, 1505 (9th Cir. 1993), (quoting
United States v. Gutierrez-Espinosa, 516 F.2d 249, 250 (9th Cir. 1975)). See generally,
Walter W. Jones, Jr., Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Instruction, in
Federal Criminal Trial, that Witnesses arePresumed to Tell the Truth, 8 A.L.R. FED. 319
(1971 & Supp. 2001).
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swear to that by the everliving God but the more I study about it
the more sure I am that nobody but the everliving God knows the
whole truth and if you summoned Christ as a witness in this case
what He would tell
you would burn your insides with the pity and
68
the mystery of it."1

The Bible recounts only one instance in which Christ
testified in a forum similar to a court. He appeared before
Pontius Pilate. Whether or not he took an oath, he is reported to
have made statements against his own interest that proved
extremely painful. His reported statements are widely accepted
as truth. Of course, no one really knows the whole truth about
Christ's life, in part because the Gospels that were written by
four of his disciples offer different and sometimes conflicting
versions of the events in Christ's life. Truth is an elusive thing.
Most witnesses are much less willing than Christ reportedly
was to make admissions that could damage them personally.
This fact is recognized in MPI 1.02, where jurors are encouraged
to evaluate the witnesses for any "apparent bias or prejudice,
[and] motive to testify truthfully or falsely," and also in the
hearsay exception for admissions against interest 69 and in the
70
concept of judicial admissions.
In two cases that address judicial admissions, the Montana
Supreme Court
quoted Wigmore, an evidence scholar who
recognized that truth is hard to come by:
Testimony in court is an elusive matter of mental operations. It is
the culmination of much talk and reflection and memory-stirring
between all concerned. It is full of surprises at the trial. The truth
of the case depends on a comparison of what all the witnesses say
and all the circumstances indicate. A rule which binds a party to

a particular statement uttered on the stand becomes
an artificial
71
rule. It is out of place in dealing with testimony.
Quoting Wigmore is as close as the Montana Supreme Court has
ever come to acknowledging that truth is elusive. Usually, the
72
court invokes the presumption that witnesses speak the truth.
A juror who is instructed the testimony of a witness is
presumed to be truthful may interpret that instruction to mean
68. CARL SANDBURG, THE PEOPLE, YES 193 (1936).
69. MONT. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
70. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-201(3)(b) (2001) and Conagra, Inc. v. Nierenberg,
2000 MT 213, 35, 301 Mont. 55, 35, 7 P.3d 369, 35.
71. 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 2594(a) at 601 (3d ed. 1940), quoted in Conagra,
Inc., supra note 63 at 44, (quoting Klemens & Son v. Reber Plumbing & Heating Co.,
139 Mont. 115, 123-24, 360 P.2d 1005, 1009-10 (1961)).
72. Benjamin v. Torgerson, 1999 MT 216, 32, 295 Mont. 528, 1 32, 985 P.2d 734,

1 32.
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at least two very different things. The instruction could mean
that courts do not expect witnesses to intentionally lie under
oath, but do expect them to tell the truth as they perceive it,
subjectively. So a witness who is asked what was said in a
conversation is presumed to accurately recite what she
remembers, although her memory may be incorrect.
The presumption of truth instruction could also mean that
courts expect what witnesses say is true in some larger, more
objective or absolute sense. This meaning would suggest the
witness not only accurately recites the conversation as she
recalls it, but that her recollection is accurate and complete.
Both meanings are reflected in Montana's statute and
pattern instruction. The statute and instruction refer to
demeanor, character, bias, consistency, and contradictory
evidence, all cues that human beings use to determine whether
another person is telling the subjective truth, the truth as she
perceives it.
The statute and pattern instruction also refer to the
witness's ability and opportunity to perceive, recall and
communicate, as well as the reasonableness of the testimony.
All of these elements are evaluated by humans when
determining whether another person's recollection is grounded
in reality - that is, if the truth as the witness perceives it really
is an accurate and complete account of the events that occurred.
Both meanings are part of what courts and lawyers refer to
when they talk about the credibility or believability of a witness.
However, because our jury instructions do not distinguish them
- and Montana's civil instruction actually melds the meanings
together - we invite jurors to confuse them, to believe that a
witness who is not lying must be speaking the truth in an
absolute, objective sense.
People should know better, both from their everyday
experience, and from seeing films such as Rashomon or My
Cousin Vinnie, or reading literature like Shakespeare's "A
Midsummer Night's Dream" or Tom Shepard's "Oleanna."
However, it is not easy for jurors to apply either their common
experience or their cultural knowledge to their job in a
courtroom. In a courtroom, jurors are asked to observe and
remember days or weeks of testimony and other evidence while
assessing the credibility and objective accuracy of a stream of
witnesses. Few people have jobs or hobbies that require them to
absorb that much information, much less to constantly evaluate
the believability of the people with whom they are dealing.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/5
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Parents may doubt their children's excuses for violating
curfew, teachers may doubt their students' excuses for tardy
papers, and law enforcement personnel may doubt everyone
they stop on the street, but none of them have to listen for hours
or days at a time to lawyers conversing with multiple witnesses
using terminology that is foreign and observing rules the
listeners don't understand and no one explains to them. Only
jurors are asked to evaluate credibility at the same time they
are denied the opportunity to gather other information that
might corroborate or undermine the stories they hear. And only
jurors have to rely solely on what they can remember of such
testimony (or a few notes they may have taken during the trial)
to make decisions that could cost someone their life or livelihood.
Most jurors have no training in assessing credibility.
Whether they really are good at it is doubtful. Researching the
ability of jurors to assess credibility is difficult because no one
but the witnesses ever really knows who told the truth at trial
and who did not. 73 However, there is research that sheds some
light on the subject. For example, there are studies showing
that juries wrongfully convicted dozens of criminal defendants
of sexual assault based on eyewitness testimony. 74 Those
defendants were finally exonerated through DNA testing. Also,
there are studies that have assessed the ability of the experts
who conduct research on children's testimonial competence, who
provide therapy to children suspected of having been abused,
and who carry out law enforcement interviews with children.
Those studies find that even highly trained professionals "failed
to detect which children were accurate and which were not,
despite being confident in their mistaken opinions." 75 If highly
trained professionals cannot distinguish fabricators from truthtellers, what chance do jurors have?
Jurors are not the only ones in the courtroom who must
take on unfamiliar roles and duties. Every witness is forced to
perform tasks that most people seldom have to do. There is no
environment other than litigation (defined broadly, to include
arbitration and legislative and administrative hearings) where
people are expected either to recall in minute detail events they
perceived months or years earlier or to communicate their
Marital spats can
recollections accurately and completely.
73.
74.

See infra pp. 29-30 and note 76.
See WOLFSON, supra note 2.

75.
STEPHEN CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK, JEOPARDY IN THE COURTROOM: A SCIENTIFIC
ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY 281 (1995).
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develop when spouses' recollections differ about some shared
experience, but neither partner is expected to, or probably even
gets the chance to relate his or her own version of events
moment-by-moment. Moreover, neither spouse has to convince
the other or any unfortunate bystanders that her version is the
truth. It seldom matters which version is the truth, so the
spouses can end the conversation both thinking each is right,
and any spectators can let the incident pass.
In court, however, the jury must decide which of the
witnesses' memories are complete and accurate. Of course, no
one has a perfect memory.
But most of the time, the
imperfections are never revealed. People seldom if ever get a
chance to compare their own memories of an event with an
accurate and objective record of the event.
"[W]ithout
independent verification, the accuracy of memory cannot be
evaluated."76 Even without independent verification, though, we
know that memory is often inaccurate.
Distortion is inevitable. Memory is distortion since memory is
invariably and inevitably selective. A way of seeing is a way of not
seeing, a way of remembering is a way of forgetting, too. If
memory were only a kind of registration, a "true" memory might
be possible. But memory is a process of encoding information,
storing information, and strategically retrieving information, and
there are social, psychological, and historical influences at each
77
point.

Memory is an adaptive skill that evolved because it was
useful to survival. "[T]he progenitor function evolved to register
facts related to the discovery of food and the avoidance of
danger." 78 Conscious recall resides in the limbic system, a
phylogenetically ancient part of the brain. 79 Even single-celled
animals demonstrate rudimentary perception and memory
abilities. Of course, in humans, perception and memory are
quite advanced.
Fortunately, memory operates with a high degree of accuracy
across many conditions and circumstances. Indeed, it is possible
76. Ted Abel, et al., Steps Toward a Molecular Definition of Memory Consolidation,
in MEMORY DISTORTION: How MINDS, BRAINS, AND SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT THE PAST
298, 320 (Schacter ed. 1995).
77. Michael Schudson, Dynamics of Distortion in Collective Memory, in MEMORY
DISTORTION: How MINDS, BRAINS, AND SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT THE PAST 346, 348

(Schacter ed. 1995).
78. Marek-Marsel Mesulam, Notes on the Cerebral Topography of Memory and
Memory Distortion: A Neurologist's Perspective, in MEMORY DISTORTION: HOW MINDS,
BRAINS, AND SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT THE PAST 379, 381 (Schacter ed. 1995).

79.

Id.
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to create conditions in which people exhibit impressively accurate
levels of recollection, recalling hundreds of previously studied
words or recognizing thousands of previously viewed pictures. The
fact that memory is often reliable makes a good deal of sense: just
like other biologically based capacities, many features of memory
are adaptations that help an organism to survive and prosper in
its environment. Given the crucial role that memory plays in
numerous aspects of everyday life, a memory system that
consistently produced seriously distorted outputs would wreak
havoc with our very existence. Nevertheless, everyday experience
and laboratory research indicate clearly that memory is far from
certain circumstances it can be
perfect, and that under
80
surprisingly inaccurate.

Memory is inaccurate because it is not a recording process,
like a video camera; rather, memory is primarily a
We do not have, or need, perfect
reconstructive process.
memories. Our memories evolved to help us find food and
shelter and function in social groups, not to testify accurately in
court. "Our species seems best adapted for accumulating
knowledge - for inference, approximation, concept formation,
and classification - not for the literal retention of the individual
In
exemplars that lead to and support general knowledge." 8'
fact, "[it could be argued that a superior talent for veridical
recall could constitute a sign of brain disease."8 2 For example,
the mentally retarded individuals known as "idiot savants" are
capable of remarkable feats of accurate recall, but cannot
reorganize facts creatively, and their memory skills do not
83
translate into job or life skills.
There are three stages of memory - perception, retention,
and retrieval.84 At each stage, "a host of factors may introduce
85
error into the subject's memory."
Memory errors occur at the perception stage for the same
reason that photographic errors result when we let our finger
fall in front of the camera lens; an event not accurately recorded
cannot be accurately retrieved. And, just like the mistakes that
occur when shooting photographs, errors in perception (and

80. Daniel Schacter, Introduction, in MEMORY DISTORTION: How MINDS, BRAINS,
AND SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT THE PAST 1-2 (Schacter ed. 1995) (citations omitted).
81. Larry Squire, Biological Foundations of Accuracy and Inaccuracy in Memory,
in MEMORY DISTORTION: How MINDS, BRAINS, AND SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT THE PAST

197, 220
82.
83.
84.
85.

(Schacter ed. 1995).
MESULAM, supra note 78, at 382.
Id. at 382-83.
ERNSDORFF & LOFTUS, supra note 6, at 155.
Id.
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thus, in memory) occur more frequently when the perceiver
"experiences an event for a short time, or is unfamiliar with the
subject, or is under a great deal of stress during the event."8 6
For most people "[s]tress enhances the recall of salient stimuli in
the environment, but impairs recall of peripheral details."8 7 If
stress impairs the perception of peripheral details, those details
can never be accurately recalled because they were never
observed.
Soon after we perceive an event, we enter the second stage
of memory, in which part of what we perceived is retained in
memory. "[Miemory is not fixed at the time of learning but
takes time to develop its permanent form."88 "[R]ecently learned
material remains vulnerable for a time to interference by the
presentation of similar material.18 9 Our memories are overlaid
by new information as it is received. 90 If the subsequent events
involve repetition and rehearsal of the memory, it will be
strengthened. 91
However, when we are exposed to new
information that is incorrect or misleading, it produces a
"misinformation effect." 92 By supplying misinformation to test
subjects, psychologists
have
easily induced erroneous
93
memories.
Two decades of research leave little doubt that misleading
information can produce errors in what subjects report that they
have seen. In some studies, the deficits in memory performance
following exposure to misinformation have been dramatic, with
performance differences exceeding 30%. With a little help from
misinformation, subjects have recalled seeing stop signs when
they were actually yield signs, hammers when they were actually
screwdrivers, and curly-haired culprits when they actually had
straight hair. Subjects have also recalled nonexistent items such
as broken glass, tape recorders, and even something as large and
conspicuous as a barn in a scene that contained no buildings at

86. Id. at 156.
87. John Krystal, Steven Southwick & Dennis Charney, Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder: Psychobiological Mechanisms of Traumatic Remembrance, in MEMORY
DISTORTION: HOW MINDS, BRAINS, AND SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT THE PAST 150, 157

(Schacter ed. 1995).
88. SQUIRE, supra note 81, at 211.
89. Id.
90. Morris Moscovitch, Confabulation, in MEMORY DISTORTION:
BRAINS, AND SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT THE PAST 226, 244-46 (Schacter ed.
91. James McGaugh, Emotional Activation, Neuromodulatory
Memory, in MEMORY DISTORTION: How MINDS, BRAINS, AND SOCIETIES
THE PAST 255, 265 (Schacter ed. 1995).
92. ERNSDORFF & LOFTUS, supra note 6, at 156.
93. Id.
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Researchers have been able to implant entire false
memories into the minds of both children and adults.95 Some
subjects have generated detailed stories about being lost in
shopping malls and insisted that the stories were true, even
after being told by the researchers and the other family
96
members who were involved that no such event ever occurred.
Recent memory tends to be more vulnerable to disruption by
misinformation than remote memory, but permanent memory
changes and fades over time in a process that appears to be
physiological.
Both remembering and forgetting "are best
understood in terms of synaptic change." 97 Synapses in the
brain change when a memory is created, and those changes
apparently are literally reversed as the memory is
forgotten. 98 "[Als time passes, memory becomes increasingly
malleable and susceptible to new information."' 99 What we
remember permanently can depend on how we feel about an
experience.
For example, individuals who dp not make it
through boot camp are more likely to remember the experience
negatively than the soldiers who did. 10 0 Permanent memory also
is more susceptible than recent memory to "inferential errors" or
"memory illusions. '"101
Memory "illusions" may result from the basic human need to make
sense out of events. A series of experiments has provided the first
scientific evidence that when people see effects (a student toppling
onto the floor) without also seeing its cause (a student leaning
back in a chair), they automatically "fill in the blank" with that
probable cause-even if they haven't actually seen it with their
own two eyes. The result: a memory that seems real, but isn't. The
inference may be correct, but it's not based on actual perception,

94.

Elizabeth Loftus, et al., The Reality of Illusory Memories, in MEMORY

DISTORTION: How MINDS, BRAINS, AND SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT THE PAST 48, 49

(Schacter ed. 1995).
95.

Id. at 62-65.

96.

Id. at 65.

97.
98.

SQUIRE, supra note 81, at 219.
Id.

99. Id. at 157.
100. A study of French bakers found that those who rose from apprentice to master
tended to forget the humiliations of apprenticeship, while those who remained workers
tended to recall them vividly. See SCHUDSON, supra note 77, at 352.
101. Press Release: People Make Sense out of Stand Alone Effects by Thinking They
'Remember' Seeing Their Probable Causes, Am. Psychological Ass'n (July 1, 2001)

<http://www.apa.org/releases/illusions.html> (summarizing Sharon Hannigan & Mark
Reinitz,

A Demonstration and Comparison of Two Types of Inference-Based Memory

Errors,27 J. EXPER. PSYC. - LEARNING, MEMORY, AND COGNITION 4).
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of the world,
suggesting that memory helps us to make sense
02
perhaps at the expense of a complete reliability.'

Such inferences are useful in everyday life, because they are
often correct. 10 3 But the inferences may be incorrect, and if the
witness does not realize it is an inference rather than a memory,
then errors will occur.
The third stage of memory is retrieval. "The factors which
influence the retrieval of a memory include the environment in
which the memory is retrieved, expectations created in the
subject's mind, the techniques used to retrieve the memory, and
the persons present."'1 4 When called on to remember an event
or series of events, our minds retrieve available memories and
organize them into a sequence and context. 0 5
The recall of an experience results from specific temporal and
spatial activity patterns across groups of neurons. Each neuron is
likely to belong to a very large number of such groups and to be
Each new
engaged by large numbers of new experiences.
experience is written on top of existing experiences.
Consequently, each new memory is likely to be altered by previous
memories and to alter existing memories. The distributed storage
of memory also enables the same experience to be recalled in many
different combinatorial 10forms
and as a result of many different
6
associative approaches.

Unfortunately, "the more heavily recollection depends on
reconstruction, the greater the possibility for distortion [or
confabulation]. "107
Scientific or psuedo-scientific attempts to improve our
ability to recall events by using hypnosis or drugs have not been
Hypnosis may help people "unearth additional
successful.
correct information" about a memory, but may also make people
more willing "to report fantasies as memories."' 0 8 Hypnoticallyenhanced memories are not admissible in a majority of
American courts because of "scores of studies demonstrating the
unreliability of hypnotically refreshed memories."'0 9 The drugs
sometimes described inaccurately as "truth serums" produce

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. KRYSTAL, supra note 87, at 158.
105. MOSCOVITCH, supra note 90, at 244.
106. MESULAM, supra note 78, at 382.
107. MOSCOVITCH, supra note 90, at 245.
108. David Spiegel, Hypnosis and Suggestion, in MEMORY DISTORTION: How MINDS,
BRAINS, AND SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT THE PAST 129, 140 (Schacter ed. 1995).
109. ERNSDORFF & LOFTUS, supra note 6, at 162.
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similar effects. 110 "Modification of memory" results even when
we simply think back occasionally on a favorite memory of
childhood. Thinking back makes the memory stronger and more
vivid, but also may change it."'
The memory process is complex and, like most human
traits, varies from person to person. Some people suppress
traumatic memories, while others do not."12 People who suffer
anxiety disorders tend to "continuous [ly] monitor.., the
environment for signals of potential threat," while people
suffering from depression are "adept at remembering vital
information concerning loss and failure to facilitate
reflection." 1 3 Some people remember names, while others are
better at remembering numbers. Many of us cannot recall what
we ate for dinner last night or the names of acquaintances we
see on the street. We forget the plots of books or movies, the
order in which everyday events occurred, and what we did on a
given day. Many of us forget information that is pleasant and
important, such as the birthdays of our children and the dates of
our anniversaries, despite the fact that remembering those
details may be critical to surviving in the environment of our
own homes.
The question to be asked, given that the memory system is
organized this way, is why memory is as good as it is. Why don't
we all confabulate? There are two answers to this question. One
is that we do confabulate - all the time, but the distortions are
sufficiently small so as not to matter. For most occasions our
memory is good enough, though we may wish it were better.
When precision of content and sequence is demanded, as it is in
eyewitness14 testimony, our memory is notoriously poor and
distorted.

Good trial attorneys have always known that memories are
weak and malleable. They know it is important to spend time
with witnesses, not just so the lawyer can learn what the
witness has to say, but because what the witness has to say can
be influenced by the questions the lawyer asks and what the
lawyer says about the case. Witnesses can be encouraged to
recall details on which their attention had not focused, and to

110. See KRYSTAL, supra note 87, at 162.
111. ERNSDORFF & LoFTuS, supra note 6, at 157-58.
112. See ABEL, supra note 76, at 318-19.
113. Susan Mineka & Kathleen Nugent, Mood-congruent Memory Biases in Anxiety
and Depression, in MEMORY DISTORTION: How MINDS, BRAINS, AND SOCIETIES
RECONSTRUCT THE PAST 173, 187 (Schacter ed. 1995).
114. KRYSTAL, supra note 87, at 246 (citation omitted).
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recall them in ways that may alter the outcome at trial.
Despite our intuitive understanding of the limitations of
human memory, lawyers and judges continue to instruct jurors
to rely on memory-based evidence, and even to presume that
uncorroborated evidence produced from human memories is
true. We assume that juries (and other finders of fact) can
distinguish truth and falsehood, even when our own experience,
which is confirmed by the results of research studies, shows that
finders of fact "have a great deal of difficulty discriminating
between memories that are a result of suggestion and memories
that are a result of a true perception or experience. "115 We know
that "Ij]udges and juries are impressed with witness testimony
116
delivered with confidence and containing concrete details."
But we also know that "a subject's confidence in a specific
memory is not necessarily related to the accuracy of that
memory."117

All of us at some time in our lives, and probably within the
past few weeks, have been convinced to believe a falsehood of
some magnitude, however trivial, by a salesperson, con artist,
sociopath, actor, or practical joker, or even by a lawyer. 118 We
know that people lie or confabulate, and we know it is not
possible for human beings to reliably or consistently
differentiate between liars or confabulaters and tellers of truth.
Yet our law assumes that every witness speaks the truth and
that jurors or judges can identify those witnesses who do not. It
is an absurd assumption, and we should discard it. Instead, we
should be telling jurors, either through instructions or expert
testimony, that their everyday experiences may not adequately
prepare them to evaluate the truth of memory-based testimony,

115. ERNSDORFF & LoFrus, supra note 6, at 163.
116. Id. at 162.
117. Id. at 163.
118. Lawyer jokes imply that lawyers are con artists or worse, which is not true, at
least of most lawyers. However, it is at least partially true that all "[glood courtroom
lawyers are super salesmen and consummate actors..." JOHN T. MALLOY, NEW DRESS
FOR SUCCESS 295 (1988), quoted in RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 517 (1995).
Mr. Malloy meant that statement as a compliment to lawyers, but Judge Posner seems
to construe it as an insult, as if sales people and actors were consummate liars. Posner
worries that if lawyers are trained as actors they will engage "incourtroom theatrics
that are as likely to deceive as to inform the jury." Id. at 516. Judge Posner, who
displays an incredible breadth of knowledge about many subjects and particularly about
social science research that ought to influence court decisions, seems to have overlooked
the research showing that jurors are persuaded not by "courtroom theatrics," whatever
that means, but by testimony that is delivered with confidence and contains concrete
details. See supra text accompanying note 116.
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that human memory is vulnerable to error at each of the three
stages of memory, and that testimony based on uncorroborated
memories should not be believed too readily.
V. WHAT DIFFERENCE WILL DISCARDING THE PRESUMPTION OF

TRUTH MAKE?

If jurors follow the courts' instructions, as we assume they
do, 1 9 then dropping the presumption of truth and replacing it
with an instruction that cautions jurors about the fallibility of
human memory, or allowing expert witnesses to testify about
the vagaries of human memory, should change the outcomes in
trials where the claims or defenses rest on uncorroborated
testimony. What claims or defenses are likely to be affected? In
this section, I will speculate about the kinds of cases in which
different outcomes could result. My speculations are meant to
be illustrative, rather than prescriptive or predictive.
Childhood Sexual Abuse
Claims for childhood sexual abuse should be more difficult
to win, particularly claims brought by adults alleging they
recovered repressed memories of abuse. Often, there is no
evidence of abuse other than the testimony of the alleged victim
and possibly her or his therapist, and scientific studies show
that recovered memories can be induced by many common
A jury forced to assess such
therapy techniques. 120
uncorroborated accusations by an alleged victim who has
something to gain, and to weigh them against uncorroborated
denials by an alleged perpetrator who has something to lose,
may well be swayed by the testimony of a social worker or
therapist vouching for the alleged victim's story, or by an
instruction presuming that witnesses speak the truth. Simple
fairness demands that the alleged perpetrator not be faced with
a presumption against him or her, and be permitted to present
experts to challenge the veracity of the allegations.
119. Jurors may not follow instructions because they do not understand them, even
though they are presumed to. See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000). Studies
show that jurors consider the evidence carefully during deliberations, and are
"remarkably competent" at finding the facts, but "consistently fare poorly on tests of
their comprehension of the judge's instructions." NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: How
JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS 34-35 (2000); see also Bethany Dumas, Jury
Trials: Lay Jurors, Pattern Jury Instructions, and Comprehension Issues, 50 DEFENSE
L.J. 345, 346 (2001).
120. ERNSDORFF & LOFTUS, supra note 6, at 158-62.
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Child abuse is a serious problem, and the consequences of
abuse can be horrendous, but allowing juries to award verdicts
against defendants who are innocent will not solve the problem
or ameliorate the consequences. Allowing plaintiffs to prevail on
claims for unredressed injuries from long-ago abuse will not do
anything to protect children today. 12 1 Protecting alleged victims
of horrible crimes does not justify depriving the alleged
perpetrators their right to defend themselves.
Discrimination
Discrimination
claims frequently rest on disputed
allegations about racist, sexist, or other inappropriate remarks
made by supervisors, lenders, landlords, and others. 122 When
the alleged remarks are oral, and uncorroborated, the jury must
decide whether or not the remarks were made - whether to
believe the plaintiffs allegations or the defendant's denials. The
exact wording of the alleged remarks can be critical to the
determination of liability. An instruction or expert testimony
cautioning jurors that human beings are prone to misperceive
details of stressful events, and to overwrite their recollections of
events with misinformation, certainly could prompt a jury to be
more skeptical about a plaintiffs recollection, and to reject
discrimination claims that might otherwise be treated favorably.
Interference with ProspectiveEconomic Advantage
Like discrimination, interference with business relations
rests on a claim that some act by the defendant was intended to
harm the plaintiff or motivated by animus toward the plaintiff.
Often, the plaintiff testifies the defendant made an oral
statement of intent or animus.123 Here again, the precise words
used and the context in which they were used, are significant.
Liability can turn on the use or meaning of a single word, or on
the speaker's inflection. Opportunities for misinterpretation
abound. A sarcastic remark might be seen as an honest
expression of opinion. A word spoken softly can be missed, or
misunderstood.
Reminding jurors that human beings do not perceive
everything that goes on around them, and may draw incorrect

121.
122.
123.

Id. at 174.
See, e.g., Crockett v. City of Billings, 234 Mont. 87,761 P.2d 813 (1988).
See, e.g., Morrow v. FBS Ins., 230 Mont. 262, 749 P.2d 1073 (1988).
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inferences about the things they missed, should help jurors
evaluate these claims and avoid placing undue reliance on
questionable testimony.
Defamation
The law has long wrestled with the challenge of
124
distinguishing between mere insults and actionable slander.
Some people are easily offended and will construe any criticism
or slight as defamatory.
Such people may be prone to
exaggerate the offensiveness of the remarks they hear, or even
hear offensive remarks when none were spoken. That a person
takes offense does not prove that anything offensive was done.
The law of defamation does not and should not impose liability
for every statement that causes some subjective pain, but only
for those that are objectively false and cause actual harm.
Reminding jurors the plaintiffs subjective perceptions may or
may not match objective reality could encourage them to protect
freedom of speech in a close case.
ContractDefenses
Replacing the presumption of truth with cautionary
instructions or testimony about testimonial evidence will not
benefit defendants in all cases.
Defendants asserting
affirmative defenses that rely on testimonial evidence also will
face a heavier, and more appropriate burden. For example, a
defendant in a contract case who asserts defenses such as
waiver, fraud, misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, or
mistake based on oral testimony would have to confront
instructions or evidence cautioning the jury about accepting
such oral testimony, particularly testimony that is self-serving.
Assumption of Risk
In tort cases, defenses such as assumption of risk in
products liability (or comparative fault in negligence cases) may
be harder to sustain. Assumption of risk requires proof the

124. For example, courts rely on the "basic tenet of the law of defamation... that
an expression of opinion is generally not actionable" when dismissing claims that seem
frivolous. Board of Dentistry v. Kandarian, 268 Mont. 408, 417, 886 P.2d 954, 959 (1994)
(quoting Frigon v. Morrison-Maierle, Inc., 233 Mont. 113, 121, 760 P.2d 57, 62 (1988)).
However, the distinction between facts and opinions is anything but obvious.
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plaintiff voluntarily exposed himself to a known risk. 125 It
usually depends on evidence of what the plaintiff said at some
point prior to the accident, and that evidence often is
uncorroborated.
Another Example
The claims and defenses mentioned here obviously are not
the only ones that would be affected by instructions and
evidence reminding jurors that human perception and memory
are imperfect and warning them not to expect precision or
accuracy from uncorroborated testimony. It is much easier for
witnesses to forget or confabulate, or to lie, when there is no
documentary or scientific evidence that challenges the
testimony.
Before blood and DNA testing made it relatively easy to
determine paternity (or at least to reliably disqualify some of the
putative fathers), an unwed mother could find it convenient to
name a wealthy man as the father of her child, as Joan Berry
named Charlie Chaplin:
Joan Berry's mistake, her lawyers said, had been to fall for
Charlie Chaplin. She was a naive young woman of modest means.
He was a wealthy and famous movie star, reputed to have had
many affairs. Sometime in December 1942, she became pregnant.
Not long after, she demanded that Chaplin pay child support for
her new daughter, Carol Ann.
It was a scandalous trial. Berry claimed she had slept with
Chaplin on December 10, 23, 24, and 30. Chaplin was required to
parade in front of the jury beside Joan and her infant child.
Chaplin's butler agreed there had been a meeting on December 23.
Chaplin himself admitted a liaison with Berry before March 1942,
but denied all the December trysts.
It emerged, however, that in November, and again the following
January and April, Joan had traveled to Tulsa, Oklahoma, where
another male companion had wined and dined her, taken her to
125. See Lutz v. National Crane Corp., 267 Mont. 368, 378, 884 P.2d 455, 461
(1994). Lutz virtually eviscerated the defense of assumption of risk, just as Hart-Albin
Co. v. McLees Inc., 264 Mont. 1, 5, 870 P.2d 51, 53 (1994), had disemboweled the defense
of misuse (it apparently would not apply even to what both the plaintiffs counsel and
the court described as "a classic example of misuse: a rotary lawnmower misused as a
hedge trimmer." Id.) Unless and until those cases are overturned, the proposal made in
this article will have little effect in products cases. It is important to note, though, that
the proposal is not directed against plaintiffs or defendants, but against whichever party
has the burden of proof on a particular point and intends to meet that burden with
uncorroborated testimony. Perhaps if this proposal had been in place when Lutz and
Hart-Albin were being decided, the Montana Supreme Court would have had less
motivation to stretch the law to favor the plaintiffs.
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the theater, and then joined her at her hotel. She had also spent
time with another man in Los Angeles, twice visiting his
apartment. And in the spring of 1943 she told Chaplin's butler
that she had married an army captain and was going to bear a
child. The jurors nevertheless
sided with Joan and Carol.
126
Chaplin would have to pay.

Chaplin had to pay because the jury decided to believe Joan's
testimony and to disbelieve Chaplin's testimony about the dates
of their liaisons. The jury's verdict ignored the weight of the
testimonial evidence, but that is the jury's prerogative.
Unfortunately, the jury ignored more than testimony. It also
ignored evidence of blood tests that proved Chaplin was not the
father.
[Almid all the confusion about just who had slept with whom in
which cities on which days, amid the Madonna-and-child staging
of the unwed mother and the randy movie star, the scientific
evidence presented by Chaplin's lawyers was not in any serious
doubt. Joan Berry had Group A blood. Her daughter, Carol Ann,
had Group B blood. This meant that the father's blood must have
been either Group AB or Group B. Charlie Chaplin's was Group
0. As three physicians testified at Chaplin's trial, to no avail,
Chaplin was not in fact Carol Ann's father. 127

Whether Joan Berry lied or confabulated does not matter. What
matters is that she sued the wrong man, and the jury (as well as
a trial judge and an appellate court) christened her faulty
memory as truth.
The appellate court's opinion does not say whether the jury
was instructed on the presumption of truth, but the presumption
was codified in California at the time, apparently was part of the
standard instructions used then, 128 and was invoked by the
appellate court to justify the jury's acceptance of Joan Berry's
testimony. 129 Whether or not the jury received a presumption of
truth instruction, it certainly was not specifically instructed that
it could disregard Berry's testimony. However, the jury was
specifically instructed that the uncontradicted medical
testimony refuting Chaplin's paternity was not "conclusive or
unanswerable" and that the jury was "therefore, ... not bound

126.

PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO's REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 148-

49 (paperback ed. 1993).
127. Id. at 168.
128. See supra text at notes 38-52. I infer from the fact that Judge Mathes included
the presumption of truth instruction in his jury instruction forms in 1960, only fifteen
years after the Berry v. Chaplin decision, the instruction was commonly used in
California courts before Mathes became a federal judge.
129. Berry v. Chaplin, 169 P.2d 442, 449 (1946).
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by such medical opinions.130 In other words, the jury was
encouraged to accept the truth of disputed testimonial evidence
at the same time it was discouraged from accepting the truth of
undisputed scientific evidence.
If truth is important in a system of justice - and it is hard to
argue that it should not be - then the verdict against Charlie
Chaplin was not only a personal loss for him but also a blow to
our profession and our system of government. Whether the
verdict resulted from instructions that elevated questionable
testimonial evidence over more reliable information we will
never know, but there is no reason to allow similar silliness to
taint any verdicts today.
VI. CONCLUSION

Our memories are flawed. Courts and lawyers ought to
recognize that, and be modest in what we expect of our own and
of others' recollection. Instead, we have told juries for more than
a century the words uttered by witnesses are presumed to be the
truth.
Abandoning the presumption of truth instruction and
replacing it with expert testimony or instructions about the
vagaries of human memory will not help jurors distinguish truth
from falsehood in every case, or prevent juries from being misled
by particularly compelling testimony. But it may make a
difference in a few close cases. It will give a stronger argument
to the lawyers who must rebut uncorroborated witnesses. It will
remind jurors of what they already know but can forget when
sitting in the alien role of finder of fact in the alien realm of the
courtroom - that none of us is very good at recalling the critical
details of everyday events, much less the most stressful
moments in our lives. And it may remind judges to be modest
about the ability of jurors and trial judges to differentiate
between truth and fabrication.
To promote those goals and start a debate in the Montana
bench and bar about the guidance that should be given to juries
on this subject, I offer the following alternative language to be
inserted in MPI 1.02 instead of the paragraph that now contains
the presumption:1 3 1
130. Id. at 452.
131. The language I propose to replace reads:
At the outset, a witness is entitled to a presumption that his or her testimony
is truthful. This presumption may be overcome, however, by any evidence
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Although every witness took an oath to tell the truth, some
witnesses may have tried to deceive you, and you may disregard
their testimony. Most witnesses probably told the truth, at least
as they perceive it, but their perception may or may not be
accurate. What a witness saw or heard at any particular time
depends on what he or she was looking at or listening to, what else
was going on at the time, and how well the witness was thinking
and paying attention. Even if the witness saw and heard an event
accurately, what the witness remembered and testified to here in
the courtroom could be affected by other things the witness saw or
heard after the event and before the trial, or simply by the passage
of time. Witnesses have been known to provide detailed and
compelling testimony about events that were entirely imagined. If
a witness's memory of events is contradicted by other evidence,
you should be suspicious about the memory. Human memory does
not work like a video camera. It would be unfair to expect any
witness to have a complete and accurate memory of the events
that are important in this case, many of which occurred months or
even years ago.

Let the debate begin!

tending to disprove that testimony or raising a substantial question as to the
witness' credibility. A witness false in one part of his or her testimony is to be
distrusted in others. However, this rule does not apply to a witness who
unintentionally commits an error.
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